Sittliche Forderung und Erkenntnis Gottes: Überlegungen zu einer alten Kontroverse
In the current discussion about the specificity of Christian ethics some theologians seem to assume that only through judaeo-christian faith can man be aware of his relationship to God as his creator. Debatable as this assumption may be, it is nevertheless important to determine how belief in God be...
| Main Author: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Electronic Article |
| Language: | German |
| Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Published: |
Ed. Pontificia Univ. Gregoriana
1978
|
| In: |
Gregorianum
Year: 1978, Volume: 59, Issue: 1, Pages: 5-37 |
| Online Access: |
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
| Parallel Edition: | Non-electronic
|
| Summary: | In the current discussion about the specificity of Christian ethics some theologians seem to assume that only through judaeo-christian faith can man be aware of his relationship to God as his creator. Debatable as this assumption may be, it is nevertheless important to determine how belief in God bears on the understanding of morality. This has been discussed by Catholic theologians since G. Vazquez and F. Suárez. All agree that logically prior to belief in God man can perceive what makes the difference between good and bad, right and wrong. There is disagreement as to the deontic character of these moral evaluations. In the view of Vazquez and others the categorical obligation of 'hating evil and adhering to the good' rests immediately on what is meant by 'evil' and 'good'. Therefore also the knowledge of this obligation is logically independent of belief in God Suárez and his folowers deny this. They hold the will of God to be the immediate 'ratio essendi' of moral obligation, and therefore conclude that only he who believes in God can perceive the moral way of life as a categorical and/or personal imperative. The view of Vazquez appears convincing, if one takes into account only the descriptive meaning of morality (as an overall maxime of life) and the gerundive character of moral appraisals. The Suarezian view seems to suffer mainly from two shortcomings: 1. a certain tendency to reduce evaluation to description; 2. kind of remainder of moral positivism which psychologically might be partly explained as mistaking the dictates of the Super-Ego for the promptings of moral conscience. Without referring to him some modern theologians side with Suárez in claiming that belief in God is a necessary logical condition for recognizing the moral imperative as categorical. Yet in a way they seem to be at the same time more consistent and radical than traditional Suarezians by supposing that without belief in God man cannot be assured of the objectivity of his value judgments. Insofar they may be said tentatively to advocate a metaethical theory akin to noncognitivism (decisionism). This theory, whereas scarcely compatible with the implications of the judaeo-christian belief in God as creator, appears to be at least highly plausible under the presupposition of atheism or agnosticism. This may be seen as an indication that the difference between cognitivism and noncognitivism in accounting for morality makes it possible to determine how belief in God bears on the understanding of morality. |
|---|---|
| Contains: | Enthalten in: Gregorianum
|