Der englische Empirismus als Bewusstseinsphilosophie. Seine Eigenart und das Problem der Geltung von Bewusstseinsinhalten in ihm
All modern philosophy from Descartes onwards is fundamentally 'philosophy of mind' ('Bewußtseinsphilosophie'): It's object is not 'nature' or 'being' in so far as they are independent from and given to human knowledge; but they are our knowledge of them:...
| Published in: | Gregorianum |
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| Main Author: | |
| Format: | Electronic Article |
| Language: | German |
| Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Published: |
Ed. Pontificia Univ. Gregoriana
1977
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| In: |
Gregorianum
Year: 1977, Volume: 58, Issue: 4, Pages: 641-674 |
| Online Access: |
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
| Parallel Edition: | Non-electronic
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| Summary: | All modern philosophy from Descartes onwards is fundamentally 'philosophy of mind' ('Bewußtseinsphilosophie'): It's object is not 'nature' or 'being' in so far as they are independent from and given to human knowledge; but they are our knowledge of them: 'the ideas in our mind'. English empiricism from Bacon and Hobbes to Locke and to its completion in Berkeley and Hume is a special form of this common modern way of doing philosophy, different from continental Rationalism and Idealism, yet connected with them by this common fundamental outlook. This article only treats the characterisation of English empiricism as a special form of the common modern philosophy of mind. Its specific completion in Berkeley and Hume, equal or even preferable to the analogous completion of continental philosophy by transcendental idealism, is reserved for separate presentation. The problem of the validity of our ideas is considered as the center of the philosophic preoccupation of English empiricism, Any 'psychologistic' interpretation of it is therefore at least simplistic. The problem of validity in English empiricism also contains the dynamics, which consequently and coherently bring this philosophy to its completion in Berkeley's acosmism and Hume's scepticism. In the first part of the article the general characteristics of English empiricism are given: 1. Its original intention is strongly realistic; but independent reality is lost by its own coherent evolution. — 2. The problem of the validity of our ideas is central for English empiricism. — 3. What from Locke onward is represented as the genetic process of the formation of our ideas is in fact a validity-orientated reconstruction. — 4. This reconstruction is of logical and 5. reductive character. In the second part the threefold importance of sense experience in English empiricism is explained: 1. It is of logical importance insofar as 'simple ideas', or 'impressions' are the ultimate elements of the reconstructive analysis of the contents of human mind. — 2. Sense experience has a critical function for the validity of our knowledge, insofar as it is passively receptive. — 3. Sense experience has an epistemological function, insofar as it has to assure the public and common character of human knowledge, which are necessary for communication and scientific progress. |
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| Contains: | Enthalten in: Gregorianum
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