Sprachanalytische und logische Bemerkungen zu Zukunftsaussagen
Statements about future events ever since Aristotle's Peri Hermeneias have created logical and epistemological puzzles. Recently futurology has added to the interest in them, sometimes giving the false impression of being a science of future events in much the same way as history is the science...
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| Format: | Electronic Article |
| Language: | German |
| Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Published: |
Ed. Pontificia Univ. Gregoriana
1976
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| In: |
Gregorianum
Year: 1976, Volume: 57, Issue: 2, Pages: 209-250 |
| Online Access: |
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
| Summary: | Statements about future events ever since Aristotle's Peri Hermeneias have created logical and epistemological puzzles. Recently futurology has added to the interest in them, sometimes giving the false impression of being a science of future events in much the same way as history is the science of past ones. In the first part, it is shown by linguistic analysis that many propositions in the future tense are not statements about future events but expressions of intentions, of fear, of hope, and so on. It suggests the interpretation of certain statements of Faith (« He will come again in glory ») as an expression of an absolutely firm hope. In the second part, logical and epistemological considerations lead us the following conclusion: Statements about future events are not simple statements but complex ones. They stand logically between categorical existential statements and hypothetical essential ones, between singular and particular ones. They have similarities and dissimilarities with all these groups. They are conditional statements, which are not detached from their general and singular conditions and thus do not become independent statements. This explains their logical particularity. The ultimate reason for this is that a future event does not yet exist. Statements about the future of necessity always express their conditions incompletely. The degree of incompleteness depends upon the context to which they belong. In some cases the conditions are not at all expressed, because the context supplies them. |
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| Contains: | Enthalten in: Gregorianum
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