L'Aristotelismo di Galileo
The article proposes to examine relationships between the science of Aristotle and that of Galileo. Accordingly, it defines the aristotelian concept of science by distinguishing the theoretical ideal of the Analytics, modelled on mathematics, from his actual practice of natural science, which is far...
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| Format: | Electronic Article |
| Language: | Italian |
| Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Published: |
Ed. Pontificia Univ. Gregoriana
1972
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| In: |
Gregorianum
Year: 1972, Volume: 53, Issue: 1, Pages: 117-144 |
| Online Access: |
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
| Summary: | The article proposes to examine relationships between the science of Aristotle and that of Galileo. Accordingly, it defines the aristotelian concept of science by distinguishing the theoretical ideal of the Analytics, modelled on mathematics, from his actual practice of natural science, which is far more problematic and empirically based. In answer to the charge of sterility brought against aristotelian science, the article denies that Aristotle exercised a general cultural domination and assigns as origin of any static quality the excessive attachment of his many disciples to the « system » and especially to the « qualitative » aspect of aristotelian science rather than to its « method and spirit ». Passing to the science of Galileo, the article finds its specifying characteristic, not in any purely negative aspect, such as the break with Aristotle, the rejection of « essences », or nominalist or agnostic phenomenalism, but in a positive factor, namely a marked bent for observation and, above all, the introduction of a mathematical instrument subordinated to sensible experience. Thus, Galilean science maintains, in common with that of Aristotle, a position of equilibrium between rationalism and empiricism, a place of privilege being reserved for experience as opposed to theoretical discussion. Because of this tempering role of experience, the mathematization of Galileo's science is essentially different from that of Descartes. If Galileo shows a tendency towards mechanism, he does not elevate it, at any rate, to the rank of a « philosophical principle »; he can always be purged of this element which, indeed, has been eliminated by virtue of scientific developments themselves. In fact, a simple scrutiny of the role of mathematics in science shows how unjustifiable is the conception of science as knowledge of predicamental quantity alone. Some examples, drawn from the history of science, then show the science of Galileo has led to a more profound knowledge of causes and essences, even if it did not succeed, and could not aspire to succeed, in reducing everything to clear and distinct cartesian-type ideas. The conclusion rejects terminological questions concerning the aristotelianism of Galileo; it is conceded to Galileo that, were Aristotle to return, he would enroll in his school. |
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| Contains: | Enthalten in: Gregorianum
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