Non-accidental piety: reliable reasoning and modally robust adherence to the divine will
In this article I formulate a skeptical argument against the possibility of adhering to the divine will in a non-accidental way. In particular, my focus in the article is on a widely embraced modal condition of accidentality, according to which non-accidentality has to do with a person manifesting d...
| Autor principal: | |
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| Tipo de documento: | Electrónico Artículo |
| Lenguaje: | Inglés |
| Verificar disponibilidad: | HBZ Gateway |
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Publicado: |
Springer Nature B. V
2022
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| En: |
International journal for philosophy of religion
Año: 2022, Volumen: 91, Número: 1, Páginas: 43-61 |
| (Cadenas de) Palabra clave estándar: | B
Will of God
/ Fulfilment
/ Intention
/ Modality
/ Thinking
/ Disposition (Psychology)
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| Clasificaciones IxTheo: | AB Filosofía de la religión AE Psicología de la religión NBE Antropología VA Filosofía |
| Otras palabras clave: | B
Epistemology of religion
B Credit B Divine Command Theory B Dispositions B Accidentality B Conscience |
| Acceso en línea: |
Volltext (kostenfrei) |
| Sumario: | In this article I formulate a skeptical argument against the possibility of adhering to the divine will in a non-accidental way. In particular, my focus in the article is on a widely embraced modal condition of accidentality, according to which non-accidentality has to do with a person manifesting dispositions that result in a given outcome in a modally robust way. The skeptical argument arises from two observations: first, various authors in the epistemology of religion have argued that it is often not possible to reason reliably about religious matters, and second, non-accidentally adhering to a given norm is often associated with reasoning about the requirements of the norm in question in a reliable way. In addition to pointing out the existence of the argument, I outline strategies in which religious thinkers could reasonably challenge it by denying that reliable reasoning about the requirements of divine will is necessary for adhering to it in a non-accidental manner. Hence, I argue that the possibility of non-accidental adherence to the divine will does not depend solely on whether it is possible to reliably reason about what it requires one to do. |
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| ISSN: | 1572-8684 |
| Obras secundarias: | Enthalten in: International journal for philosophy of religion
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1007/s11153-021-09806-x |