Non-accidental piety: reliable reasoning and modally robust adherence to the divine will
In this article I formulate a skeptical argument against the possibility of adhering to the divine will in a non-accidental way. In particular, my focus in the article is on a widely embraced modal condition of accidentality, according to which non-accidentality has to do with a person manifesting d...
| Main Author: | |
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| Format: | Electronic Article |
| Language: | English |
| Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | Drawer...
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Published: |
Springer Nature B. V
2022
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| In: |
International journal for philosophy of religion
Year: 2022, Volume: 91, Issue: 1, Pages: 43-61 |
| Standardized Subjects / Keyword chains: | B
Will of God
/ Fulfilment
/ Intention
/ Modality
/ Thinking
/ Disposition (Psychology)
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| IxTheo Classification: | AB Philosophy of religion; criticism of religion; atheism AE Psychology of religion NBE Anthropology VA Philosophy |
| Further subjects: | B
Epistemology of religion
B Credit B Divine Command Theory B Dispositions B Accidentality B Conscience |
| Online Access: |
Volltext (kostenfrei) |
| Summary: | In this article I formulate a skeptical argument against the possibility of adhering to the divine will in a non-accidental way. In particular, my focus in the article is on a widely embraced modal condition of accidentality, according to which non-accidentality has to do with a person manifesting dispositions that result in a given outcome in a modally robust way. The skeptical argument arises from two observations: first, various authors in the epistemology of religion have argued that it is often not possible to reason reliably about religious matters, and second, non-accidentally adhering to a given norm is often associated with reasoning about the requirements of the norm in question in a reliable way. In addition to pointing out the existence of the argument, I outline strategies in which religious thinkers could reasonably challenge it by denying that reliable reasoning about the requirements of divine will is necessary for adhering to it in a non-accidental manner. Hence, I argue that the possibility of non-accidental adherence to the divine will does not depend solely on whether it is possible to reliably reason about what it requires one to do. |
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| ISSN: | 1572-8684 |
| Contains: | Enthalten in: International journal for philosophy of religion
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1007/s11153-021-09806-x |