The Starting-Points for Knowledge: Chrysippus on How to Acquire and Fortify Insecure Apprehension

This paper examines some neglected Chrysippean fragments on insecure apprehension (κατάληψις). First, I present Chrysippus’ account of how non-Sages can begin to fortify their insecure apprehension and upgrade it into knowledge (ἐπιστήμη). Next, I reconstruct Chrysippus’ explanation of how sophisms...

Full description

Saved in:  
Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Shogry, Simon (Author)
Format: Electronic Article
Language:English
Check availability: HBZ Gateway
Journals Online & Print:
Drawer...
Fernleihe:Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste
Published: Brill 2022
In: Phronesis
Year: 2022, Volume: 67, Issue: 1, Pages: 62-98
Further subjects:B cognitive impression
B Stoic epistemology
B Custom
B criterion of truth
B Academic skepticism
B Assent
Online Access: Volltext (kostenfrei)
Volltext (kostenfrei)
Description
Summary:This paper examines some neglected Chrysippean fragments on insecure apprehension (κατάληψις). First, I present Chrysippus’ account of how non-Sages can begin to fortify their insecure apprehension and upgrade it into knowledge (ἐπιστήμη). Next, I reconstruct Chrysippus’ explanation of how sophisms and counter-arguments lead one to abandon one’s insecure apprehension. One such counter-argument originates in the sceptical Academy and targets the Stoic claim that insecure apprehension can be acquired on the basis of custom (συνήθεια). I show how Chrysippus could defend the possibility of custom-based apprehension, while also denying that there is custom-based knowledge.
ISSN:1568-5284
Contains:Enthalten in: Phronesis
Persistent identifiers:DOI: 10.1163/15685284-bja10051