Revising Reasons Reactivity: Weakly and Strongly Sufficient Reasons for Acting

In Responsibility and Control: A Theory of Moral Responsibility John Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza propose an account of moral responsibility according to which an agent is morally responsible for an action just when that action is the product of her own moderately reasons-responsive mechanism, wh...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Waller, Robyn Repko (Author)
Format: Electronic Article
Language:English
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Published: Springer Science + Business Media B. V 2014
In: Ethical theory and moral practice
Year: 2014, Volume: 17, Issue: 3, Pages: 529-543
Further subjects:B Alfred Mele
B John Martin Fischer
B Weakness of will
B Moral Responsibility
B Reasons
Online Access: Volltext (JSTOR)
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig)

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