Revising Reasons Reactivity: Weakly and Strongly Sufficient Reasons for Acting

In Responsibility and Control: A Theory of Moral Responsibility John Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza propose an account of moral responsibility according to which an agent is morally responsible for an action just when that action is the product of her own moderately reasons-responsive mechanism, wh...

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Κύριος συγγραφέας: Waller, Robyn Repko (Συγγραφέας)
Τύπος μέσου: Ηλεκτρονική πηγή Άρθρο
Γλώσσα:Αγγλικά
Έλεγχος διαθεσιμότητας: HBZ Gateway
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Interlibrary Loan:Interlibrary Loan for the Fachinformationsdienste (Specialized Information Services in Germany)
Έκδοση: 2014
Στο/Στη: Ethical theory and moral practice
Έτος: 2014, Τόμος: 17, Τεύχος: 3, Σελίδες: 529-543
Άλλες λέξεις-κλειδιά:B Alfred Mele
B John Martin Fischer
B Weakness of will
B Moral Responsibility
B Reasons
Διαθέσιμο Online: Volltext (JSTOR)
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Περιγραφή
Σύνοψη:In Responsibility and Control: A Theory of Moral Responsibility John Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza propose an account of moral responsibility according to which an agent is morally responsible for an action just when that action is the product of her own moderately reasons-responsive mechanism, where reasons-responsiveness is explained in terms of the mechanism’s regular reasons-receptivity and weak reasons-reactivity. In a review of Fischer and Ravizza’s book Mele contends that their weakly reasons-reactivity condition is inadequate, constructing a case in which, according to their theory, an extreme agoraphobic is morally responsible for his staying in his home. In this paper I modify Fischer and Ravizza’s account of moral responsibility in light of Mele’s problematic example, suggesting a refinement of their weakly reasons-reactivity requirement via a distinction between weakly sufficient reasons and strongly sufficient reasons.
ISSN:1572-8447
Περιλαμβάνει:Enthalten in: Ethical theory and moral practice
Persistent identifiers:DOI: 10.1007/s10677-013-9460-1