Other People’s Errors
The question of when other people’s bad acts belong on our moral ledger arises in a number of different scenarios. Each scenario has received some philosophical attention, but no one has noted the structural similarities of these various scenarios or the implications of a proposed approach to one fo...
| Main Author: | |
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| Format: | Electronic Article |
| Language: | English |
| Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | Drawer...
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Published: |
Springer Science + Business Media B. V
2013
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| In: |
Ethical theory and moral practice
Year: 2013, Volume: 16, Issue: 5, Pages: 1049-1059 |
| Further subjects: | B
Proportionality
B Preemptive restrictions B Duty to rescue B Lesser evils B Retreat B Complicity B Rules B Moral blackmail |
| Online Access: |
Volltext (JSTOR) Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
| Summary: | The question of when other people’s bad acts belong on our moral ledger arises in a number of different scenarios. Each scenario has received some philosophical attention, but no one has noted the structural similarities of these various scenarios or the implications of a proposed approach to one for how the others should be approached. That is the ambition of this article. In it, seemingly disparate moral phenomena—blunt rules, preemptive restrictions, moral blackmail, complicity, retreat and proportional response, and the duty to rescue from a peril one has caused—are shown to have similar structures and thus to require similar moral approaches. |
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| ISSN: | 1572-8447 |
| Contains: | Enthalten in: Ethical theory and moral practice
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1007/s10677-012-9399-7 |