The Difference Between Moral and Rational “Oughts”: An Expressivist Account

Morality and rationality are both normative: the moral claim “you ought to help others” is a genuine normative judgment, as well as the rational maxim “you ought to brush your teeth twice a day”. But it seems that there is a crucial difference these two judgments. In the first part of this paper, I...

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Главный автор: Schulte, Peter (Автор)
Формат: Электронный ресурс Статья
Язык:Английский
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Interlibrary Loan:Interlibrary Loan for the Fachinformationsdienste (Specialized Information Services in Germany)
Опубликовано: 2012
В: Ethical theory and moral practice
Год: 2012, Том: 15, Выпуск: 2, Страницы: 159-174
Другие ключевые слова:B Rationality
B Expressivism
B Metaethics
B Moral judgments
B Speech Acts
B Normativity
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Итог:Morality and rationality are both normative: the moral claim “you ought to help others” is a genuine normative judgment, as well as the rational maxim “you ought to brush your teeth twice a day”. But it seems that there is a crucial difference these two judgments. In the first part of this paper, I argue that this difference is to be understood as a difference between two kinds of normativity: demanding and recommending normativity. But the crucial task is, of course, to explain the difference. In the second part of this paper, I suggest that metaethical expressivists can provide a good explanation: by extending the analysis of ordinary (non-normative) demands and recommendations to normative judgments, they can formulate a convincing account that captures the key differences between morality and rationality.
ISSN:1572-8447
Второстепенные работы:Enthalten in: Ethical theory and moral practice
Persistent identifiers:DOI: 10.1007/s10677-011-9276-9