Sentimentalism: Its Scope and Limits
The subject of this paper is sentimentalism. In broad terms this is the view that value concepts, moral concepts, practical reasons—some or all of these—can be analysed in terms of feeling, sentiment or emotion. More specifically, the paper discusses the following theses: , there are reasons to feel...
| Published in: | Ethical theory and moral practice |
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| Main Author: | |
| Format: | Electronic Article |
| Language: | English |
| Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | Drawer...
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Published: |
Springer Science + Business Media B. V
2010
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| In: |
Ethical theory and moral practice
Year: 2010, Volume: 13, Issue: 2, Pages: 125-136 |
| Further subjects: | B
Reasons
B Blame B Egoism B Sentimentalism |
| Online Access: |
Volltext (JSTOR) Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
| Summary: | The subject of this paper is sentimentalism. In broad terms this is the view that value concepts, moral concepts, practical reasons—some or all of these—can be analysed in terms of feeling, sentiment or emotion. More specifically, the paper discusses the following theses: , there are reasons to feel (‘evaluative’ reasons) that are not reducible to practical or epistemic reasons, value is analysable in terms of these reasons to feel., all practical reasons are in one way or another grounded in evaluative reasons., (i) and (ii) are accepted while (iii) is rejected. |
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| ISSN: | 1572-8447 |
| Contains: | Enthalten in: Ethical theory and moral practice
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1007/s10677-009-9210-6 |