Why Levelling Down could be Worse for Prioritarianism than for Egalitarianism

Derek Parfit has argued that, in contrast to prioritarianism, egalitarianism is exposed to the levelling down objection, i.e., the objection that it is absurd that a change which consists merely in the betteroff losing some of their well-being should be in one way for the better. In reply, this pape...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Ethical theory and moral practice
Main Author: Persson, Ingmar (Author)
Format: Electronic Article
Language:English
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Published: Springer Science + Business Media B. V 2008
In: Ethical theory and moral practice
Year: 2008, Volume: 11, Issue: 3, Pages: 295-303
Further subjects:B Justice
B Prioritarianism
B Priority to the worse-off
B Derek Parfit
B Equality
B Levelling down objection
B Egalitarianism
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Summary:Derek Parfit has argued that, in contrast to prioritarianism, egalitarianism is exposed to the levelling down objection, i.e., the objection that it is absurd that a change which consists merely in the betteroff losing some of their well-being should be in one way for the better. In reply, this paper contends that (1) there is a plausible form of egalitarianism which is equivalent to another form of prioritarianism than the Parfitian one, a relational rather than an absolute form of prioritarianism, and that (2), although this relational or egalitarian form of prioritarianism is hit by the levelling down objection, the Parfitian form is also hit by it, or worse objections, if it is fully worked out.
ISSN:1572-8447
Contains:Enthalten in: Ethical theory and moral practice
Persistent identifiers:DOI: 10.1007/s10677-007-9102-6