Foreign Aid and the Moral Value of Freedom

Peter Singer has famously argued that people living in affluent western countries are morally obligated to donate money to famine relief. The central premise in his argument is that, “If it is in our power to prevent something bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable mo...

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Главный автор: Peterson, Martin (Автор)
Формат: Электронный ресурс Статья
Язык:Английский
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Опубликовано: Springer Science + Business Media B. V 2004
В: Ethical theory and moral practice
Год: 2004, Том: 7, Выпуск: 3, Страницы: 293-307
Другие ключевые слова:B Famine relief
B Singer
B Ethics
B foreign aid
B final value
B Pareto principle
B Sen
Online-ссылка: Volltext (JSTOR)
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Итог:Peter Singer has famously argued that people living in affluent western countries are morally obligated to donate money to famine relief. The central premise in his argument is that, “If it is in our power to prevent something bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance, we ought, morally, to do so.” The present paper offers an argument to the effect that affluent people ought to support foreign aid projects based on a much weaker ethical premise. The new premise states that, “If it is in our power to prevent something bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything of moral importance, we ought, morally, to do so.” This premise, supplemented with a notion of final value drawing on Amartya Sen's concept of freedom as capabilities and functionings, is conceived as a special version of a weak, egalitarian Pareto principle.
ISSN:1572-8447
Второстепенные работы:Enthalten in: Ethical theory and moral practice
Persistent identifiers:DOI: 10.1023/B:ETTA.0000042977.55857.c7