Why Naturalism?

My goal in this paper is to explain what ethical naturalism is, to locate the pivotal issue between naturalists and non-naturalists, and to motivate taking naturalism seriously. I do not aim to establish the truth of naturalism nor to answer the various familiar objections to it. But I do aim to mot...

Full description

Saved in:  
Bibliographic Details
Published in:Ethical theory and moral practice
Main Author: Copp, David (Author)
Format: Electronic Article
Language:English
Check availability: HBZ Gateway
Journals Online & Print:
Drawer...
Fernleihe:Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste
Published: Springer Science + Business Media B. V 2003
In: Ethical theory and moral practice
Further subjects:B Non-naturalism
B A priori
B moral properties
B Empirical
B causal properties
B Naturalism
Online Access: Volltext (JSTOR)
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig)

MARC

LEADER 00000naa a22000002 4500
001 1785692739
003 DE-627
005 20220112044051.0
007 cr uuu---uuuuu
008 220112s2003 xx |||||o 00| ||eng c
024 7 |a 10.1023/A:1024420725408  |2 doi 
035 |a (DE-627)1785692739 
035 |a (DE-599)KXP1785692739 
040 |a DE-627  |b ger  |c DE-627  |e rda 
041 |a eng 
084 |a 1  |2 ssgn 
100 1 |a Copp, David  |e VerfasserIn  |4 aut 
245 1 0 |a Why Naturalism? 
264 1 |c 2003 
336 |a Text  |b txt  |2 rdacontent 
337 |a Computermedien  |b c  |2 rdamedia 
338 |a Online-Ressource  |b cr  |2 rdacarrier 
520 |a My goal in this paper is to explain what ethical naturalism is, to locate the pivotal issue between naturalists and non-naturalists, and to motivate taking naturalism seriously. I do not aim to establish the truth of naturalism nor to answer the various familiar objections to it. But I do aim to motivate naturalism sufficiently that the attempt to deal with the objections will seem worthwhile. I propose that naturalism is best understood as the view that the moral properties are natural in the sense that they are empirical. I pursue certain issues in the understanding of the empirical. The crux of the matter is whether any synthetic proposition about the instantiation of a moral property is strongly a priori in that it does not admit of empirical evidence against it. I propose an argument from epistemic defeaters that, I believe, undermines the plausibility of a priorism in ethics and supports the plausibility of naturalism. 
650 4 |a Non-naturalism 
650 4 |a Naturalism 
650 4 |a moral properties 
650 4 |a Empirical 
650 4 |a causal properties 
650 4 |a A priori 
773 0 8 |i Enthalten in  |t Ethical theory and moral practice  |d Dordrecht [u.a.] : Springer Science + Business Media B.V, 1998  |g 6(2003), 2, Seite 179-200  |h Online-Ressource  |w (DE-627)320527093  |w (DE-600)2015306-5  |w (DE-576)104558555  |x 1572-8447  |7 nnns 
773 1 8 |g volume:6  |g year:2003  |g number:2  |g pages:179-200 
856 |3 Volltext  |u http://www.jstor.org/stable/27500032  |x JSTOR 
856 4 0 |u https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1024420725408  |x Resolving-System  |z lizenzpflichtig  |3 Volltext 
935 |a mteo 
936 u w |d 6  |j 2003  |e 2  |h 179-200 
951 |a AR 
ELC |a 1 
ITA |a 1  |t 1 
LOK |0 000 xxxxxcx a22 zn 4500 
LOK |0 001 4033751637 
LOK |0 003 DE-627 
LOK |0 004 1785692739 
LOK |0 005 20220112044051 
LOK |0 008 220112||||||||||||||||ger||||||| 
LOK |0 035   |a (DE-Tue135)IxTheo#2021-12-30#E2996B1B1F4A96BF203F926D49C8EB732ADD9D0D 
LOK |0 040   |a DE-Tue135  |c DE-627  |d DE-Tue135 
LOK |0 092   |o n 
LOK |0 852   |a DE-Tue135 
LOK |0 852 1  |9 00 
LOK |0 866   |x JSTOR#http://www.jstor.org/stable/27500032 
LOK |0 935   |a ixzs  |a ixrk  |a zota 
ORI |a SA-MARC-ixtheoa001.raw