Practical rationality for pluralists about the good
I argue that if a normative theory of practical rationality is to represent an adequate and coherent response to a plurality of incommensurable goods, it cannot be a maximising theory. It will have to be a theory that recognises two responses to goods as morally licit – promotion and respect – and o...
| Κύριος συγγραφέας: | |
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| Τύπος μέσου: | Ηλεκτρονική πηγή Άρθρο |
| Γλώσσα: | Αγγλικά |
| Έλεγχος διαθεσιμότητας: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | Φόρτωση...
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| Interlibrary Loan: | Interlibrary Loan for the Fachinformationsdienste (Specialized Information Services in Germany) |
| Έκδοση: |
2003
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| Στο/Στη: |
Ethical theory and moral practice
Έτος: 2003, Τόμος: 6, Τεύχος: 2, Σελίδες: 161-177 |
| Άλλες λέξεις-κλειδιά: | B
Axiology
B Deontology B Incommensurability B Practical rationality B Consequentialism B Normative ethics |
| Διαθέσιμο Online: |
Volltext (JSTOR) Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |