Sidgwick's Problem
Henry Sidgwick regarded his failure to reconcile the claims of rational egoism with those of utilitarianism to reveal a “fundamental contradiction” within practical reason. However, the conflict that concerns him arises only in relation to a particular kind of agent. While Sidgwick construes his ver...
| Main Author: | |
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| Format: | Electronic Article |
| Language: | English |
| Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
| Interlibrary Loan: | Interlibrary Loan for the Fachinformationsdienste (Specialized Information Services in Germany) |
| Published: |
2002
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| In: |
Ethical theory and moral practice
Year: 2002, Volume: 5, Issue: 1, Pages: 45-65 |
| Further subjects: | B
Happiness
B Morality B Sidgwick B Rationality B Duty B Utilitarianism B Egoism B Self-interest B Practical Reasoning |
| Online Access: |
Volltext (JSTOR) Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
| Summary: | Henry Sidgwick regarded his failure to reconcile the claims of rational egoism with those of utilitarianism to reveal a “fundamental contradiction” within practical reason. However, the conflict that concerns him arises only in relation to a particular kind of agent. While Sidgwick construes his version of the problem to be a systematic formulation of a conflict that arises within the practical reasoning of ordinary people, it is actually an example of a worst-case scenario that reflects the common philosophical tendency to deal with issues in their most challenging form. But such a transformation of ordinary conflicts between self-interest and morality into an insoluble philosophical problem obscures the nature of the more typical practical conflict. |
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| ISSN: | 1572-8447 |
| Contains: | Enthalten in: Ethical theory and moral practice
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1023/A:1014471407365 |
