On Being One's Own Person
The aim of the paper is to provide a philosophical account of our sense that some people are more their own person than others. I begin by exposing the weaknesses in three possible accounts, which I label the "interventionist", the "existentialist" and the "ideal" accou...
| Auteur principal: | |
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| Type de support: | Électronique Article |
| Langue: | Anglais |
| Vérifier la disponibilité: | HBZ Gateway |
| Interlibrary Loan: | Interlibrary Loan for the Fachinformationsdienste (Specialized Information Services in Germany) |
| Publié: |
1998
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| Dans: |
Ethical theory and moral practice
Année: 1998, Volume: 1, Numéro: 4, Pages: 447-466 |
| Sujets non-standardisés: | B
Authenticity
B Frankfurt B Nietzsche B Berlin B Mill B real desires B individual nature B Sartre B Existentialism B character-formation |
| Accès en ligne: |
Volltext (JSTOR) Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
| Résumé: | The aim of the paper is to provide a philosophical account of our sense that some people are more their own person than others. I begin by exposing the weaknesses in three possible accounts, which I label the "interventionist", the "existentialist" and the "ideal" accounts. I then go on to argue that the distinguishing feature of those who are their own person is that their natural inclinations are accurately expressed in their behaviour. |
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| ISSN: | 1572-8447 |
| Contient: | Enthalten in: Ethical theory and moral practice
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1023/A:1009974313773 |
