What Does CEOs’ Pay-for-Performance Reveal About Shareholders’ Attitude Toward Earnings Overstatements?
If overstatements were a symptom of the agency conflict, pay-for-performance sensitivities should have increased in response to the additional penalties for misreporting imposed by SOX. Our finding of their decrease is inconsistent with the view that overstatements were an unintended consequence of...
| VerfasserInnen: | ; ; |
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| Medienart: | Elektronisch Aufsatz |
| Sprache: | Englisch |
| Verfügbarkeit prüfen: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | Lade...
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Veröffentlicht: |
2017
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| In: |
Journal of business ethics
Jahr: 2017, Band: 146, Heft: 2, Seiten: 419-450 |
| weitere Schlagwörter: | B
G32
B G34 B L21 B M52 B M41 B J33 B CEO incentive pay B M43 B Sarbanes–Oxley Act B Pay-for-performance sensitivity B Firm objectives B Earnings management B Shareholder myopia |
| Online-Zugang: |
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