What Does CEOs’ Pay-for-Performance Reveal About Shareholders’ Attitude Toward Earnings Overstatements?
If overstatements were a symptom of the agency conflict, pay-for-performance sensitivities should have increased in response to the additional penalties for misreporting imposed by SOX. Our finding of their decrease is inconsistent with the view that overstatements were an unintended consequence of...
| Главные авторы: | ; ; |
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| Формат: | Электронный ресурс Статья |
| Язык: | Английский |
| Проверить наличие: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | Загрузка...
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| Interlibrary Loan: | Interlibrary Loan for the Fachinformationsdienste (Specialized Information Services in Germany) |
| Опубликовано: |
2017
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| В: |
Journal of business ethics
Год: 2017, Том: 146, Выпуск: 2, Страницы: 419-450 |
| Другие ключевые слова: | B
G32
B G34 B L21 B M52 B M41 B J33 B CEO incentive pay B M43 B Sarbanes–Oxley Act B Pay-for-performance sensitivity B Firm objectives B Earnings management B Shareholder myopia |
| Online-ссылка: |
Volltext (JSTOR) Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
| Итог: | If overstatements were a symptom of the agency conflict, pay-for-performance sensitivities should have increased in response to the additional penalties for misreporting imposed by SOX. Our finding of their decrease is inconsistent with the view that overstatements were an unintended consequence of incentive pay prior to 2002. To corroborate our interpretation, we show that (i) CEO pay-for-performance sensitivities are higher among firms whose shareholders stand to benefit from overstatements; (ii) this cross-sectional relationship weakens significantly after SOX; and (iii) the within-firm decrease in pay-for-performance sensitivity is most pronounced among firms with high pre-SOX shareholder benefits from overstatements. |
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| ISSN: | 1573-0697 |
| Второстепенные работы: | Enthalten in: Journal of business ethics
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1007/s10551-015-2891-y |
