Political Connectedness, Corporate Governance, and Firm Performance
In this paper, we present and test a theory of how political connectedness (often linked to political corruption) affects corporate governance and productive efficiency of firms. Our model predicts that underdeveloped democratic institutions that do not punish political corruption result in politica...
| Main Author: | |
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| Contributors: | ; |
| Format: | Electronic Article |
| Language: | English |
| Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | Drawer...
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| Interlibrary Loan: | Interlibrary Loan for the Fachinformationsdienste (Specialized Information Services in Germany) |
| Published: |
2016
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| In: |
Journal of business ethics
Year: 2016, Volume: 139, Issue: 2, Pages: 411-428 |
| Further subjects: | B
Productivity
B Politicians B Corporate governance B Political connectedness B Political corruption B State-owned enterprises |
| Online Access: |
Volltext (JSTOR) Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
| Summary: | In this paper, we present and test a theory of how political connectedness (often linked to political corruption) affects corporate governance and productive efficiency of firms. Our model predicts that underdeveloped democratic institutions that do not punish political corruption result in political connectedness of firms that in turn has a negative effect on performance. We test this prediction on an almost complete population of Slovenian joint-stock companies with 100 or more employees. Using the data on supervisory board structure, together with balance sheet and income statement data for 2000–2010, we show that a higher share of politically connected supervisory board members leads to lower productivity. |
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| ISSN: | 1573-0697 |
| Contains: | Enthalten in: Journal of business ethics
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1007/s10551-015-2675-4 |