CEO Accountability for Corporate Fraud: Evidence from the Split Share Structure Reform in China
We use institutional-related theories and a unique natural experiment that enables an exogenous test of the influence of controlling shareholders on managerial accountability to corporate fraud. In China, prior to the Split Share Structure Reform (SSSR), state shareholders held restricted shares tha...
| Authors: | ; ; ; |
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| Format: | Electronic Article |
| Language: | English |
| Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | Drawer...
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Published: |
Springer
2016
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| In: |
Journal of business ethics
Year: 2016, Volume: 138, Issue: 4, Pages: 787-806 |
| Further subjects: | B
Ownership
B CEO turnover B China B Corporate fraud B Split Share Structure Reform |
| Online Access: |
Volltext (JSTOR) Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
| Summary: | We use institutional-related theories and a unique natural experiment that enables an exogenous test of the influence of controlling shareholders on managerial accountability to corporate fraud. In China, prior to the Split Share Structure Reform (SSSR), state shareholders held restricted shares that could not be traded. This restriction mitigated state-owned enterprise controlling shareholders’ incentives to monitor managers. The data examined show the SSSR strengthens incentives of state-owned enterprise controlling shareholders to replace fraudulent management. Our findings support the view that economic incentives are important to promote corporate governance and deter fraud. |
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| ISSN: | 1573-0697 |
| Contains: | Enthalten in: Journal of business ethics
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1007/s10551-014-2467-2 |