Political Connections and Industrial Pollution: Evidence Based on State Ownership and Environmental Levies in China

We investigate how state involvement in the ownership of non-listed entrepreneurial firms affects pollution fees levied by national and provincial governments in China (environmental levies). While the national government sets minimum environmental standards, provincial governments can enact require...

ver descrição completa

Na minha lista:  
Detalhes bibliográficos
Authors: Maung, Min (Author) ; Wilson, Craig (Author) ; Tang, Xiaobo (Author)
Tipo de documento: Recurso Electrónico Artigo
Idioma:Inglês
Verificar disponibilidade: HBZ Gateway
Journals Online & Print:
Carregar...
Fernleihe:Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste
Publicado em: Springer Science + Business Media B. V 2016
Em: Journal of business ethics
Ano: 2016, Volume: 138, Número: 4, Páginas: 649-659
Outras palavras-chave:B Political connections
B state ownership
B Environmental levies
B Industrial pollution
Acesso em linha: Volltext (JSTOR)
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig)
Descrição
Resumo:We investigate how state involvement in the ownership of non-listed entrepreneurial firms affects pollution fees levied by national and provincial governments in China (environmental levies). While the national government sets minimum environmental standards, provincial governments can enact requirements that exceed these minimums, and they are largely responsible for enforcing even the national standards, so environmental levies can measure concessions that provinces make to encourage development and employment. Furthermore, state ownership is a good proxy for a firm’s political connections, which can influence the relationship between the firm and the environmental authorities. We find that firms with state ownership pay lower environmental levies, which indicates that concessions are made for political or economic purposes. However, these concessions are conditional on the level of development of the province offering them, with better developed provinces providing fewer concessions.
ISSN:1573-0697
Obras secundárias:Enthalten in: Journal of business ethics
Persistent identifiers:DOI: 10.1007/s10551-015-2771-5