The Effects of CEO Trustworthiness on Directors’ Monitoring and Resource Provision
Because of the importance of board members’ resource provision and monitoring, a substantial body of research has been devoted to ascertaining how directors can be incented to perform their responsibilities. We use social exchange theory to empirically examine how board members’ resource provision a...
Main Author: | |
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Contributors: | ; ; |
Format: | Electronic Article |
Language: | English |
Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
Journals Online & Print: | |
Interlibrary Loan: | Interlibrary Loan for the Fachinformationsdienste (Specialized Information Services in Germany) |
Published: |
2013
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In: |
Journal of business ethics
Year: 2013, Volume: 118, Issue: 1, Pages: 155-169 |
Further subjects: | B
Board evaluation
B Trustworthiness B Directors of the board B Resource provision B Monitoring |
Online Access: |
Presumably Free Access Volltext (JSTOR) Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
Summary: | Because of the importance of board members’ resource provision and monitoring, a substantial body of research has been devoted to ascertaining how directors can be incented to perform their responsibilities. We use social exchange theory to empirically examine how board members’ resource provision and monitoring are affected by their perceptions of the CEOs’ trustworthiness. Our findings suggest that board members’ perceptions of the CEO’s ability, benevolence, and integrity have different effects on the board members’ resource provision and monitoring. Our results further suggest that board members’ governance behaviors are moderated by the board’s performance evaluation practices. |
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ISSN: | 1573-0697 |
Contains: | Enthalten in: Journal of business ethics
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Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1007/s10551-012-1575-0 |