Monitoring Costs, Managerial Ethics and Corporate Governance: A Modeling Approach
This article evaluates effectiveness and costs of external regulation, in particular the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) in restricting managerial malfeasance and safeguarding shareholder interests. It discusses the role of managerial ethics as an alternative corporate governance mechanism to prote...
| Authors: | ; |
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| 格式: | 電子 Article |
| 語言: | English |
| Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
| Interlibrary Loan: | Interlibrary Loan for the Fachinformationsdienste (Specialized Information Services in Germany) |
| 出版: |
2011
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| In: |
Journal of business ethics
Year: 2011, 卷: 99, 發布: 4, Pages: 623-635 |
| Further subjects: | B
Sarbanes–Oxley Act
B 企業管理 B managerial ethics B 監測 |
| 在線閱讀: |
Volltext (JSTOR) Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
| 總結: | This article evaluates effectiveness and costs of external regulation, in particular the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) in restricting managerial malfeasance and safeguarding shareholder interests. It discusses the role of managerial ethics as an alternative corporate governance mechanism to protect shareholder value. This article builds a mathematical model to illustrate shareholders’ choices of best corporate governance mechanisms, taking into account the influence of managerial ethics, effectiveness and costs of monitoring. We suggest that the best corporate governance design and the optimal monitoring expenses are influenced by managerial types, monitoring efficiency, and effectiveness of ethics education. We conclude that stringent regulation and monitoring may not always enhance shareholder value. When managerial ethics could be improved by ethics education or social norms, ethics education may be a better alternative than stringent regulation. |
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| ISSN: | 1573-0697 |
| Contains: | Enthalten in: Journal of business ethics
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1007/s10551-010-0672-1 |
