Deadly Drugs and the Doctrine of Double Effect: A Reply to Tully

In a recent contribution to this journal, Patrick Tully criticizes my view that the doctrine of double effect does not prohibit a pharmaceutical company from selling a drug that has potentially fatal side-effects and that does not treat a life-threatening condition. Tully alleges my account is too p...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Journal of business ethics
Main Author: Masek, Lawrence (Author)
Format: Electronic Article
Language:English
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Published: Springer Science + Business Media B. V 2006
In: Journal of business ethics
Year: 2006, Volume: 68, Issue: 2, Pages: 143-151
Further subjects:B material cooperation
B foreseen effect
B Proportionality
B Natural Law
B Intention
B formal cooperation
B principle of double effect
B intended effect
B Consequentialism
B Intrinsic evil
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Description
Summary:In a recent contribution to this journal, Patrick Tully criticizes my view that the doctrine of double effect does not prohibit a pharmaceutical company from selling a drug that has potentially fatal side-effects and that does not treat a life-threatening condition. Tully alleges my account is too permissive and makes the doctrine irrelevant to decisions about selling harmful products. In the following paper, I respond to Tully’s objections and show that he misinterprets my position and misstates some elements of the doctrine of double effect. I also show how the doctrine constrains some decisions about marketing drugs with potentially fatal side-effects.
ISSN:1573-0697
Contains:Enthalten in: Journal of business ethics
Persistent identifiers:DOI: 10.1007/s10551-006-9060-2