On the alleged connection between moral evil and human freedom: A response to Trakakis’ second critique

In this essay, I answer Nick Trakakis’ second critique of my argument against the adequacy of traditional free will theodicy. I argue, first, that Trakakis errs in his implicit assertion that my argument relies upon our being strongly malevolent by nature. I argue, second, that Trakakis errs in thin...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Tierno, Joel Thomas (Author)
Format: Electronic Article
Language:English
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Published: Springer Netherlands 2006
In: Sophia
Year: 2006, Volume: 45, Issue: 2, Pages: 131-138
Further subjects:B Human Freedom
B Adequate Explanation
B Moral Evil
B Natural Disposition
B Receive Nature
Online Access: Volltext (lizenzpflichtig)

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