On the alleged connection between moral evil and human freedom: A response to Trakakis’ second critique
In this essay, I answer Nick Trakakis’ second critique of my argument against the adequacy of traditional free will theodicy. I argue, first, that Trakakis errs in his implicit assertion that my argument relies upon our being strongly malevolent by nature. I argue, second, that Trakakis errs in thin...
| Κύριος συγγραφέας: | |
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| Τύπος μέσου: | Ηλεκτρονική πηγή Άρθρο |
| Γλώσσα: | Αγγλικά |
| Έλεγχος διαθεσιμότητας: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | Φόρτωση...
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| Interlibrary Loan: | Interlibrary Loan for the Fachinformationsdienste (Specialized Information Services in Germany) |
| Έκδοση: |
2006
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| Στο/Στη: |
Sophia
Έτος: 2006, Τόμος: 45, Τεύχος: 2, Σελίδες: 131-138 |
| Άλλες λέξεις-κλειδιά: | B
Human Freedom
B Adequate Explanation B Moral Evil B Natural Disposition B Receive Nature |
| Διαθέσιμο Online: |
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
| Σύνοψη: | In this essay, I answer Nick Trakakis’ second critique of my argument against the adequacy of traditional free will theodicy. I argue, first, that Trakakis errs in his implicit assertion that my argument relies upon our being strongly malevolent by nature. I argue, second, that Trakakis errs in thinking that our being weakly benevolent, morally bivalent, or weakly malevolent by nature is sufficient to refute my critique of the traditional freewill theodicy. I still maintain that the argument from freedom of the will offers an explanation of moral evil that is, in the final analysis, manifestly inadequate. |
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| ISSN: | 1873-930X |
| Περιλαμβάνει: | Enthalten in: Sophia
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1007/BF02782488 |
