A semantic attack on divine-command metaethics
According to divine-command metaethics (DCM), whatever is morally good or right has that status because, and only because, it conforms to God’s will. I argue that DCM is false or vacuous: either DCM is false, or else there are no instantiated moral properties, and no moral truths, to which DCM can e...
| Главный автор: | |
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| Формат: | Электронный ресурс Статья |
| Язык: | Английский |
| Проверить наличие: | HBZ Gateway |
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| Interlibrary Loan: | Interlibrary Loan for the Fachinformationsdienste (Specialized Information Services in Germany) |
| Опубликовано: |
2004
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| В: |
Sophia
Год: 2004, Том: 43, Выпуск: 2, Страницы: 15-28 |
| Другие ключевые слова: | B
Green Thing
B Divine Command B Traditional Theism B Moral Truth B Semantic Objection |
| Online-ссылка: |
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
| Итог: | According to divine-command metaethics (DCM), whatever is morally good or right has that status because, and only because, it conforms to God’s will. I argue that DCM is false or vacuous: either DCM is false, or else there are no instantiated moral properties, and no moral truths, to which DCM can even apply. The sort of criticism I offer is familiar, but I develop it in what I believe is a novel way. |
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| ISSN: | 1873-930X |
| Второстепенные работы: | Enthalten in: Sophia
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1007/BF02780509 |