On the alleged connection between Moral Evil and human freedom: Response to Nagasawa and Trakakis
In this essay, I respond to two criticisms of my essay, ‘On the Alleged Connection between Moral Evil and Human Freedom’. According to Yujin Nagasawa, I equivocate on the meaning of ‘moral evil.’ I respond by offering what I believe to be an unobjectionable stipulative under-standing of what counts...
Main Author: | |
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Format: | Electronic Article |
Language: | English |
Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
Journals Online & Print: | |
Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
Published: |
Springer Netherlands
2004
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In: |
Sophia
Year: 2004, Volume: 43, Issue: 1, Pages: 115-126 |
Further subjects: | B
Natural Inclination
B Adequate Explanation B Free Action B Free Choice B Relative Distribution |
Online Access: |
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
Summary: | In this essay, I respond to two criticisms of my essay, ‘On the Alleged Connection between Moral Evil and Human Freedom’. According to Yujin Nagasawa, I equivocate on the meaning of ‘moral evil.’ I respond by offering what I believe to be an unobjectionable stipulative under-standing of what counts as moral evil which is sufficient for my argument. According to Nick Trakakis, I seriously misunderstand the conception of freedom characteristic of free will theodicists. He suggests that my argument presupposes compatibilism. I respond by showing that my argument does not presuppose the denial of the capacity to have done otherwise. |
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ISSN: | 1873-930X |
Contains: | Enthalten in: Sophia
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Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1007/BF02782441 |