Minds, programs, and Chinese philosophers: A Chinese perspective on the Chinese room

The paper is concerned with John Searle’s famous Chinese room argument. Despite being objected to by some, Searle’s Chinese room argument appears very appealing. This is because Searle’s argument is based on an intuition about the mind that ‘we’ all seem to share. Ironically, however, Chinese philos...

Description complète

Enregistré dans:  
Détails bibliographiques
Auteur principal: Tanaka, Koji (Auteur)
Type de support: Électronique Article
Langue:Anglais
Vérifier la disponibilité: HBZ Gateway
Journals Online & Print:
En cours de chargement...
Fernleihe:Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste
Publié: Springer Netherlands 2004
Dans: Sophia
Année: 2004, Volume: 43, Numéro: 1, Pages: 61-72
Sujets non-standardisés:B Western Philosophy
B Folk Psychology
B Chinese Script
B Chinese Room
B Chinese Philosopher
Accès en ligne: Volltext (lizenzpflichtig)
Description
Résumé:The paper is concerned with John Searle’s famous Chinese room argument. Despite being objected to by some, Searle’s Chinese room argument appears very appealing. This is because Searle’s argument is based on an intuition about the mind that ‘we’ all seem to share. Ironically, however, Chinese philosophers don’t seem to share this same intuition. The paper begins by first analysing Searle’s Chinee room argument. It then introduces what can be seen as the (implicit) Chinese view of the mind. Lastly, it demonstrates a conceptual difference between Chinese and Western philosophy with respect to the notion of mind. Thus, it is shown that one must carefully attend to the presuppositions underlying Chinese philosophising in interpreting Chinese philosophers.
ISSN:1873-930X
Contient:Enthalten in: Sophia
Persistent identifiers:DOI: 10.1007/BF02782437