Is rowe committed to an expanded version of theism?
I argue in this paper two theses. First, I argue that the internal consistency of the argument from evil demands that it take into account some form of EST. Thus, there is no ground for the atheist to chide the theist when the theist appeals to an expanded version of theism. Second, I show that it i...
| Main Author: | |
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| Format: | Electronic Article |
| Language: | English |
| Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | Drawer...
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| Interlibrary Loan: | Interlibrary Loan for the Fachinformationsdienste (Specialized Information Services in Germany) |
| Published: |
2002
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| In: |
Sophia
Year: 2002, Volume: 41, Issue: 2, Pages: 31-40 |
| Further subjects: | B
Great Good
B Concept Means B Expand Version B Evidential Argument B Robust Version |
| Online Access: |
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
| Summary: | I argue in this paper two theses. First, I argue that the internal consistency of the argument from evil demands that it take into account some form of EST. Thus, there is no ground for the atheist to chide the theist when the theist appeals to an expanded version of theism. Second, I show that it isprima facie probable that RST does in fact ential EST. I show this by capitalizing on the distinction between what is contained in a concept and what is entailed by a concept. What a term or concept means is different from what it may entail. What a concept or term entails is conceptually more robust than what it simply means. I call this the “containment objection” and if is true, then the restricted conjunction rule cannot apply since a version of theism sufficient to deflate the evidential argument would not be logically independent from RST,pace Rowe. |
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| ISSN: | 1873-930X |
| Contains: | Enthalten in: Sophia
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1007/BF02912234 |