Explanatory priority and independence: On an argument against middle knowledge
A Molinist should not embrace the independence thesis. He also can defend the thesis that counterfactuals of freedom depend on a counterfactual act. Although such a move may seem illicit in the sense thatexplanandum andexplanans presuppose each other, I defend the view that counterfactuals of freedo...
| Main Author: | |
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| Format: | Electronic Article |
| Language: | English |
| Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
| Interlibrary Loan: | Interlibrary Loan for the Fachinformationsdienste (Specialized Information Services in Germany) |
| Published: |
1999
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| In: |
Sophia
Year: 1999, Volume: 38, Issue: 2, Pages: 1-14 |
| Further subjects: | B
Causal Dependence
B Actual World B Counterfactual Dependence B Logical Priority B Explanatory Priority |
| Online Access: |
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
| Summary: | A Molinist should not embrace the independence thesis. He also can defend the thesis that counterfactuals of freedom depend on a counterfactual act. Although such a move may seem illicit in the sense thatexplanandum andexplanans presuppose each other, I defend the view that counterfactuals of freedom are very deeply embedded in our metaphysics and we cannot therefore satisfactorily explain them with the help of other devices. |
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| ISSN: | 1873-930X |
| Contains: | Enthalten in: Sophia
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1007/BF02786329 |
