Truth-Conditions and Necessary Existence

My objectives are twofold. I want first to show (mainly following John Hick) that there is a conception of necessary existence or aseity, distinct from a conception of ‘logically necessary being’, which is at least prima facie plausible and second to show, with respect to this specific conception, t...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Nielsen, Kai (Author)
Format: Electronic Article
Language:English
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Published: Cambridge Univ. Press 1974
In: Scottish journal of theology
Year: 1974, Volume: 27, Issue: 3, Pages: 257-267
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Summary:My objectives are twofold. I want first to show (mainly following John Hick) that there is a conception of necessary existence or aseity, distinct from a conception of ‘logically necessary being’, which is at least prima facie plausible and second to show, with respect to this specific conception, that there are relevant questions about stating truth-conditions which are unsatisfied and perhaps even in principle unsatisfiable, and that these are questions which must be met before such a prima facie plausible conception can be taken to give us the basis of a satisfactory theological elucidation of what it is to speak of God. I shall argue that it is doubtful whether these questions about truth-conditions can be met.
ISSN:1475-3065
Contains:Enthalten in: Scottish journal of theology
Persistent identifiers:DOI: 10.1017/S0036930600058737