Moral rights and the meaning of torture: a response to Nigel Biggar
This article challenges Nigel Biggar’s claim that there are no natural moral rights. Focusing on Biggar’s analysis of torture, I argue that he does not give adequate consideration to the possibility of intrinsically wrong actions. This oversight not only leads to a problematic, consequentialist anal...
| Autor principal: | |
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| Tipo de documento: | Electrónico Artículo |
| Lenguaje: | Inglés |
| Verificar disponibilidad: | HBZ Gateway |
| Interlibrary Loan: | Interlibrary Loan for the Fachinformationsdienste (Specialized Information Services in Germany) |
| Publicado: |
2021
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| En: |
Anglican theological review
Año: 2021, Volumen: 103, Número: 4, Páginas: 409-415 |
| Otras palabras clave: | B
Human Rights
B Torture B Moral Theology B natural rights B Consequentialism |
| Acceso en línea: |
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
| Sumario: | This article challenges Nigel Biggar’s claim that there are no natural moral rights. Focusing on Biggar’s analysis of torture, I argue that he does not give adequate consideration to the possibility of intrinsically wrong actions. This oversight not only leads to a problematic, consequentialist analysis of torture—it also weakens his argument against the possibility of absolute rights. |
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| ISSN: | 2163-6214 |
| Obras secundarias: | Enthalten in: Anglican theological review
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1177/00033286211029664 |
