Moral rights and the meaning of torture: a response to Nigel Biggar
This article challenges Nigel Biggar’s claim that there are no natural moral rights. Focusing on Biggar’s analysis of torture, I argue that he does not give adequate consideration to the possibility of intrinsically wrong actions. This oversight not only leads to a problematic, consequentialist anal...
| Main Author: | |
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| Format: | Electronic Article |
| Language: | English |
| Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
| Interlibrary Loan: | Interlibrary Loan for the Fachinformationsdienste (Specialized Information Services in Germany) |
| Published: |
2021
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| In: |
Anglican theological review
Year: 2021, Volume: 103, Issue: 4, Pages: 409-415 |
| Further subjects: | B
Human Rights
B Torture B Moral Theology B natural rights B Consequentialism |
| Online Access: |
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
| Summary: | This article challenges Nigel Biggar’s claim that there are no natural moral rights. Focusing on Biggar’s analysis of torture, I argue that he does not give adequate consideration to the possibility of intrinsically wrong actions. This oversight not only leads to a problematic, consequentialist analysis of torture—it also weakens his argument against the possibility of absolute rights. |
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| ISSN: | 2163-6214 |
| Contains: | Enthalten in: Anglican theological review
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1177/00033286211029664 |
