Molinism: The Contemporary Debate. Edited by Ken Perszyk
Molinism is the theory (first advanced by Luis de Molina in the sixteenth century) that God, besides the direct knowledge he has of everything actual (including humans’ free actions) and the wider knowledge he has of everything possible (including what they might have freely done but didn’t), has a...
Main Author: | |
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Format: | Electronic Review |
Language: | English |
Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
Journals Online & Print: | |
Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
Published: |
Oxford University Press
2012
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In: |
The journal of theological studies
Year: 2012, Volume: 63, Issue: 2, Pages: 806-808 |
Review of: | Molinism (Oxford [u.a.] : Oxford University Press, 2011) (Sturch, Richard)
Molinism (Oxford [u.a.] : Oxford University Press, 2011) (Sturch, Richard) |
Further subjects: | B
Book review
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Online Access: |
Volltext (JSTOR) Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
Summary: | Molinism is the theory (first advanced by Luis de Molina in the sixteenth century) that God, besides the direct knowledge he has of everything actual (including humans’ free actions) and the wider knowledge he has of everything possible (including what they might have freely done but didn’t), has a ‘middle knowledge’ whereby he knows what they would have freely done in circumstances which never in fact arose. For many years this theory was ignored; if the essence of a free action is that it could go two or more different ways until it actually happens, then a free action in imaginary circumstances could also have gone two or more ways (and of course has no ‘actually happened’ about it). |
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ISSN: | 1477-4607 |
Contains: | Enthalten in: The journal of theological studies
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Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1093/jts/fls107 |