‘Kierkegaard’: A Reasonable Fideist?
The task I set myself is to identify whether Climacus is an extreme or moderate fideist, and to go on to evaluate how convincing or persuasive I find Climacus' position. Separating metaphysical and epistemological fideism, I spend the first section of the article denying that Climacus is a ‘met...
Main Author: | |
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Format: | Electronic Article |
Language: | English |
Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
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Published: |
Wiley-Blackwell
1998
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In: |
Heythrop journal
Year: 1998, Volume: 39, Issue: 4, Pages: 363-378 |
Online Access: |
Presumably Free Access Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
Summary: | The task I set myself is to identify whether Climacus is an extreme or moderate fideist, and to go on to evaluate how convincing or persuasive I find Climacus' position. Separating metaphysical and epistemological fideism, I spend the first section of the article denying that Climacus is a ‘metaphysical fideist’. This involves looking at the notion of ‘truth as subjectivity’. I will claim that in expounding this notorious maxim Climacus can be seen as expressing something almost trivially obvious and/or something substantially wrong. I will further argue that even the obvious version of the maxim needs to be heavily qualified before it can be a sufficient account of ‘religious truth’. In the second section of the article I argue that Climacus should be understood as a moderate fideist, who considers that reason should assent to its own limitations. Although I will approve of reason-exhausting projects, I will complain that the paradox which is supposed to so exhaust my reason does not perplex me in the relevant sense. |
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ISSN: | 1468-2265 |
Contains: | Enthalten in: Heythrop journal
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Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1111/1468-2265.00084 |