DOES A NORMAL FOETUS REALLY HAVE A FUTURE OF VALUE? A REPLY TO MARQUIS
The traditional approach to the abortion debate revolves around numerous issues, such as whether the foetus is a person, whether the foetus has rights, and more. Don Marquis suggests that this traditional approach leads to a standoff and that the abortion debate ‘requires a different strategy.’1 Hen...
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| Format: | Electronic Article |
| Language: | English |
| Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | Drawer...
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Published: |
Wiley-Blackwell
2005
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| In: |
Bioethics
Year: 2005, Volume: 19, Issue: 2, Pages: 131-145 |
| Online Access: |
Presumably Free Access Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
| Summary: | The traditional approach to the abortion debate revolves around numerous issues, such as whether the foetus is a person, whether the foetus has rights, and more. Don Marquis suggests that this traditional approach leads to a standoff and that the abortion debate ‘requires a different strategy.’1 Hence his ‘future of value’ strategy, which is summarized as follows: 1 A normal foetus has a future of value. 2 Depriving a normal foetus of a future of value imposes a misfortune on it. 3 Imposing a misfortune on a normal foetus is prima facie wrong. 4 Therefore, depriving a normal foetus of a future of value is prima facie wrong. 5 Killing a normal foetus deprives it of a future of value. 6 Therefore, killing a normal foetus is prima facie wrong. In this paper, I argue that Marquis's strategy is not different since it involves the concept of person – a concept deeply rooted in the traditional approach. Specifically, I argue that futures are valuable insofar as they are not only dominated by goods of consciousness, but are experienced by psychologically continuous persons. Moreover, I argue that his strategy is not sound since premise (1) is false. Specifically, I argue that a normal foetus, at least during the first trimester, is not a person. Thus, during that stage of development it is not capable of experiencing its future as a psychologically continuous person and, hence, it does not have a future of value. |
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| ISSN: | 1467-8519 |
| Contains: | Enthalten in: Bioethics
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-8519.2005.00430.x |