Killing, Letting Die and Moral Perception: A Reply to Grant Gillett

A number of philosophers in recent times have employed arguments to show that there is no morally relevant difference between killing a patient and allowing that patient to die in those circumstances where the outcome is virtually identical and where death is preventable, at least for a significant...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Thornton, Jim (Author)
Format: Electronic Article
Language:English
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Published: Wiley-Blackwell 1999
In: Bioethics
Year: 1999, Volume: 13, Issue: 5, Pages: 414-425
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Summary:A number of philosophers in recent times have employed arguments to show that there is no morally relevant difference between killing a patient and allowing that patient to die in those circumstances where the outcome is virtually identical and where death is preventable, at least for a significant time. From his perspective as both a philosopher and a clinician, Grant Gillett has rejected such general and abstract arguments in the light of the intuitions and moral perceptions available to clinicians and those who care for the terminally ill. I argue that his strategy fails, is massively question-begging, and that his appeal to the notion of ‘moral particularism’, far from being an alternative to cogent philosophical argument, actually supports the very position he has attempted to discredit.
ISSN:1467-8519
Contains:Enthalten in: Bioethics
Persistent identifiers:DOI: 10.1111/1467-8519.00169