“H Newman” and Ludwig Wittgenstein: Re-evaluating the History of John Henry Newman's Philosophical Reception
It is commonly held that that the dominance of logical positivism, in the early part of the twentieth-century, hindered Newman's philosophical recognition. However, commentators also argue that Newman's writing began to gain wider recognition following Wittgenstein's reference to “H N...
| 1. VerfasserIn: | |
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| Medienart: | Elektronisch Aufsatz |
| Sprache: | Englisch |
| Verfügbarkeit prüfen: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | Lade...
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Wiley-Blackwell
2020
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| In: |
New blackfriars
Jahr: 2020, Band: 101, Heft: 1096, Seiten: 716-725 |
| weitere Schlagwörter: | B
Philosophical Reception
B Linguistic Philosophy B Logical Positivism B Ludwig Wittgenstein B John Henry Newman |
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Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
| Zusammenfassung: | It is commonly held that that the dominance of logical positivism, in the early part of the twentieth-century, hindered Newman's philosophical recognition. However, commentators also argue that Newman's writing began to gain wider recognition following Wittgenstein's reference to “H Newman” (1969) in the posthumous publication of On Certainty. This essay explores whether or not this version of the history of Newman's philosophical reception rings true – exploring whether or not the reference to “H Newman” really marks a watershed for Newman's philosophical legacy. |
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| ISSN: | 1741-2005 |
| Enthält: | Enthalten in: New blackfriars
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1111/nbfr.12527 |