Evil, Privation, Depression and Dread
In this essay I examine the idea that evil is to be understood as a kind of absence or a privation. I put forward two arguments against this idea. The first claims that if evil is an absence it becomes causally powerless, which seems strongly contradicted by experience and revelation. The other argu...
| Autor principal: | |
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| Tipo de documento: | Recurso Electrónico Artigo |
| Idioma: | Inglês |
| Verificar disponibilidade: | HBZ Gateway |
| Interlibrary Loan: | Interlibrary Loan for the Fachinformationsdienste (Specialized Information Services in Germany) |
| Publicado em: |
2013
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| Em: |
New blackfriars
Ano: 2013, Volume: 94, Número: 1053, Páginas: 552-564 |
| Outras palavras-chave: | B
Depressão
B privatio boni B Evil B Privation B Brian Davies |
| Acesso em linha: |
Volltext (JSTOR) Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
| Resumo: | In this essay I examine the idea that evil is to be understood as a kind of absence or a privation. I put forward two arguments against this idea. The first claims that if evil is an absence it becomes causally powerless, which seems strongly contradicted by experience and revelation. The other argument says that the idea that evil is an absence cannot do justice to the evil of depression. Depression is a set of feelings which are all too real, and so cannot be understood as literally identical with a set of absences. |
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| ISSN: | 1741-2005 |
| Obras secundárias: | Enthalten in: New blackfriars
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1111/j.1741-2005.2012.01516.x |
