Evil, Privation, Depression and Dread
In this essay I examine the idea that evil is to be understood as a kind of absence or a privation. I put forward two arguments against this idea. The first claims that if evil is an absence it becomes causally powerless, which seems strongly contradicted by experience and revelation. The other argu...
Main Author: | |
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Format: | Electronic Article |
Language: | English |
Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
Journals Online & Print: | |
Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
Published: |
Cambridge University Press
2013
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In: |
New blackfriars
Year: 2013, Volume: 94, Issue: 1053, Pages: 552-564 |
Further subjects: | B
privatio boni
B Evil B Privation B Depression B Brian Davies |
Online Access: |
Volltext (JSTOR) Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
Summary: | In this essay I examine the idea that evil is to be understood as a kind of absence or a privation. I put forward two arguments against this idea. The first claims that if evil is an absence it becomes causally powerless, which seems strongly contradicted by experience and revelation. The other argument says that the idea that evil is an absence cannot do justice to the evil of depression. Depression is a set of feelings which are all too real, and so cannot be understood as literally identical with a set of absences. |
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ISSN: | 1741-2005 |
Contains: | Enthalten in: New blackfriars
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Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1111/j.1741-2005.2012.01516.x |