What the Problem with Russell Isn't
Mark Nelson thinks that Bertrand Russell's well-known criticisms of St. Thomas Aquinas turn on Russell's acceptance of a highly implausible epistemic principle (DAM), and that my previous objection to this claim depends upon the attribution to Russell of an even more implausible Insincerit...
| 主要作者: | |
|---|---|
| 格式: | 電子 Article |
| 語言: | English |
| Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
| Interlibrary Loan: | Interlibrary Loan for the Fachinformationsdienste (Specialized Information Services in Germany) |
| 出版: |
2009
|
| In: |
New blackfriars
Year: 2009, 卷: 90, 發布: 1030, Pages: 680-686 |
| Further subjects: | B
Theology
B philosophy of religion B Nelson B Russell B Aquinas |
| 在線閱讀: |
Presumably Free Access Volltext (JSTOR) Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
| Parallel Edition: | Non-electronic
|
| 總結: | Mark Nelson thinks that Bertrand Russell's well-known criticisms of St. Thomas Aquinas turn on Russell's acceptance of a highly implausible epistemic principle (DAM), and that my previous objection to this claim depends upon the attribution to Russell of an even more implausible Insincerity Objection. While I agree that Russell's criticisms do not turn on the Insincerity Objection, I argue that my previous rejection of the attribution of (DAM) to Russell is well-justified: there is a plausible reading of Russell that requires neither (DAM) nor the Insincerity Objection. |
|---|---|
| ISSN: | 1741-2005 |
| Contains: | Enthalten in: New blackfriars
|
| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1111/j.1741-2005.2009.01299.x |
