What the Problem with Russell Isn't
Mark Nelson thinks that Bertrand Russell's well-known criticisms of St. Thomas Aquinas turn on Russell's acceptance of a highly implausible epistemic principle (DAM), and that my previous objection to this claim depends upon the attribution to Russell of an even more implausible Insincerit...
| Auteur principal: | |
|---|---|
| Type de support: | Électronique Article |
| Langue: | Anglais |
| Vérifier la disponibilité: | HBZ Gateway |
| Interlibrary Loan: | Interlibrary Loan for the Fachinformationsdienste (Specialized Information Services in Germany) |
| Publié: |
2009
|
| Dans: |
New blackfriars
Année: 2009, Volume: 90, Numéro: 1030, Pages: 680-686 |
| Sujets non-standardisés: | B
Theology
B philosophy of religion B Nelson B Russell B Aquinas |
| Accès en ligne: |
Accès probablement gratuit Volltext (JSTOR) Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
| Édition parallèle: | Non-électronique
|
| Résumé: | Mark Nelson thinks that Bertrand Russell's well-known criticisms of St. Thomas Aquinas turn on Russell's acceptance of a highly implausible epistemic principle (DAM), and that my previous objection to this claim depends upon the attribution to Russell of an even more implausible Insincerity Objection. While I agree that Russell's criticisms do not turn on the Insincerity Objection, I argue that my previous rejection of the attribution of (DAM) to Russell is well-justified: there is a plausible reading of Russell that requires neither (DAM) nor the Insincerity Objection. |
|---|---|
| ISSN: | 1741-2005 |
| Contient: | Enthalten in: New blackfriars
|
| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1111/j.1741-2005.2009.01299.x |
