What the Problem with Russell Isn't
Mark Nelson thinks that Bertrand Russell's well-known criticisms of St. Thomas Aquinas turn on Russell's acceptance of a highly implausible epistemic principle (DAM), and that my previous objection to this claim depends upon the attribution to Russell of an even more implausible Insincerit...
| 1. VerfasserIn: | |
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| Medienart: | Elektronisch Aufsatz |
| Sprache: | Englisch |
| Verfügbarkeit prüfen: | HBZ Gateway |
| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Veröffentlicht: |
2009
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| In: |
New blackfriars
Jahr: 2009, Band: 90, Heft: 1030, Seiten: 680-686 |
| weitere Schlagwörter: | B
Theology
B philosophy of religion B Nelson B Russell B Aquinas |
| Online-Zugang: |
Vermutlich kostenfreier Zugang Volltext (JSTOR) Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
| Parallele Ausgabe: | Nicht-Elektronisch
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| Zusammenfassung: | Mark Nelson thinks that Bertrand Russell's well-known criticisms of St. Thomas Aquinas turn on Russell's acceptance of a highly implausible epistemic principle (DAM), and that my previous objection to this claim depends upon the attribution to Russell of an even more implausible Insincerity Objection. While I agree that Russell's criticisms do not turn on the Insincerity Objection, I argue that my previous rejection of the attribution of (DAM) to Russell is well-justified: there is a plausible reading of Russell that requires neither (DAM) nor the Insincerity Objection. |
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| ISSN: | 1741-2005 |
| Enthält: | Enthalten in: New blackfriars
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1111/j.1741-2005.2009.01299.x |
