Intending Damage to Basic Goods
Richard McCormick justified his move to proportionalism in part because of the perceived inadequacy of the Grisez-Finnis approach to morality to answer the following question: “What is to count for turning against a basic good, and why?” In this paper, I provide the beginnings of an account of what...
Main Author: | |
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Format: | Electronic Article |
Language: | English |
Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
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Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
Published: |
[S.l.]
Oxford University Press
[2010]
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In: |
Christian bioethics
Year: 2008, Volume: 14, Issue: 3, Pages: 272-282 |
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Volltext (kostenfrei) Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
Parallel Edition: | Electronic
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Summary: | Richard McCormick justified his move to proportionalism in part because of the perceived inadequacy of the Grisez-Finnis approach to morality to answer the following question: “What is to count for turning against a basic good, and why?” In this paper, I provide the beginnings of an account of what it means to intend damage to a good; I then show that the account is readily exportable to judgments regarding killing and lying defended by Grisez and others. I then indicate that the account comports well with some of what Grisez says about sexual morality and suggest areas in which further clarification is necessary. In thus proceeding, I hope to inoculate the Grisez view from McCormick's reservations. |
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ISSN: | 1744-4195 |
Contains: | Enthalten in: Christian bioethics
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