Double Effect and the Ethical Significance of Distinct Volitional States
Much of Roman Catholic discussion concerning bioethical controversies, such as the surgical removal of a life-threatening cancerous uterus when the fetus is not viable, has focused on the employment of double-effect reasoning. While double-effect reasoning has been the subject of much debate, this p...
Main Author: | |
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Format: | Electronic Article |
Language: | English |
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Published: |
Oxford University Press
1997
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In: |
Christian bioethics
Year: 1997, Volume: 3, Issue: 2, Pages: 131-141 |
Online Access: |
Presumably Free Access Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
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Summary: | Much of Roman Catholic discussion concerning bioethical controversies, such as the surgical removal of a life-threatening cancerous uterus when the fetus is not viable, has focused on the employment of double-effect reasoning. While double-effect reasoning has been the subject of much debate, this paper argues first, that there is a distinction between the intended and the foreseen; second, that this distinction applies to the contrasted cases in such a way as to categorize foreseen but not intended consequences; and third, that this intended/foreseen distinction has essential ethical significance. |
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ISSN: | 1744-4195 |
Contains: | Enthalten in: Christian bioethics
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Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1093/cb/3.2.131 |