Why God Thinks what He is Thinking?: An Argument against Samuel Newlands' Brute-Fact-Theory of Divine Ideas in Leibniz's Metaphysics
According to the most prominent principle of early modern rationalists, the Principle of Sufficient Reason [PSR], there are no brute facts, hence, there are no facts without any explanation. Contrary to the PSR, some philosophers have argued that divine ideas are brute facts within Leibniz's me...
| Main Author: | |
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| Format: | Electronic Article |
| Language: | English |
| Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Published: |
University of Innsbruck in cooperation with the John Hick Centre for Philosophy of Religion at the University of Birmingham
2021
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| In: |
European journal for philosophy of religion
Year: 2021, Volume: 13, Issue: 3, Pages: 171-185 |
| Standardized Subjects / Keyword chains: | B
Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm 1646-1716
/ Existence of God
/ Newlands, Samuel 197X-
/ Providence
/ Metaphysics
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| IxTheo Classification: | AB Philosophy of religion; criticism of religion; atheism NBC Doctrine of God |
| Further subjects: | B
Rationalism
B Leibniz B ideas B Modality |
| Online Access: |
Presumably Free Access Volltext (doi) Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
| Summary: | According to the most prominent principle of early modern rationalists, the Principle of Sufficient Reason [PSR], there are no brute facts, hence, there are no facts without any explanation. Contrary to the PSR, some philosophers have argued that divine ideas are brute facts within Leibniz's metaphysics. In this paper, I argue against brute-fact-theories of divine ideas, especially represented by Samuel Newlands in Leibniz and the Ground of Possibility, and elaborate an alternative Leibnizian theory of divine ideas. |
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| Contains: | Enthalten in: European journal for philosophy of religion
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.24204/ejpr.2021.3301 |