Contingenza o validità universale?: Richard Rorty e Karl-Otto Apel sul progresso morale
This paper examines two opposing contemporary answers to the question of whether moral values and norms are suitable for rational criticism and justifi cation: Richard Rorty’s radically contextualist approach – which is centred around the notion of contingency and is characterised by...
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Format: | Electronic Article |
Language: | Italian |
Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
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Interlibrary Loan: | Interlibrary Loan for the Fachinformationsdienste (Specialized Information Services in Germany) |
Published: |
2011
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In: |
Annali di studi religiosi
Year: 2011, Volume: 12, Pages: 171-183 |
Online Access: |
Volltext (kostenfrei) |
Summary: | This paper examines two opposing contemporary answers to the question of whether moral values and norms are suitable for rational criticism and justifi cation: Richard Rorty’s radically contextualist approach – which is centred around the notion of contingency and is characterised by a dismissal of all claims to philosophical justifi cation – and Karl-Otto Apel’s transcendental-pragmatic version of discourse ethics – which encompasses highly ambitious claims to justifi cation and universal validity. Contrasting the key theses of Rorty’s contextualism with those of Apel’s universalist discourse ethics, and reconstructing their respective conceptions of moral progress, we argue that neither Rorty’s nor Apel’s position is convincing. |
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ISSN: | 2284-3892 |
Contains: | Enthalten in: Annali di studi religiosi
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