Six Methods in Ethics: In Defence of Giving Non-Lexical Priority to Higher Level Intuitions
This article examines the problem of how to deal with conflicting intuitions in ethics at different levels. It presents six different methods to assess which kinds of intuitions should prevail in our considerations, depending on the relative importance these methods give to intuitions about particul...
Authors: | ; |
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Format: | Electronic Article |
Language: | English |
Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
Journals Online & Print: | |
Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
Published: |
Peeters
2021
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In: |
Ethical perspectives
Year: 2021, Volume: 28, Issue: 2, Pages: 181-200 |
Standardized Subjects / Keyword chains: | B
Intuition
/ Ethics
/ Method
|
IxTheo Classification: | NCA Ethics ZD Psychology |
Online Access: |
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
Summary: | This article examines the problem of how to deal with conflicting intuitions in ethics at different levels. It presents six different methods to assess which kinds of intuitions should prevail in our considerations, depending on the relative importance these methods give to intuitions about particular cases, principles and metacriteria. To do this, the article introduces the concept of metacriterion-intuitions. The article then argues in favour of giving non-lexical priority to higher level moral intuitions. To do this, it presents and defends a second-order method consisting in four criteria based on the idea that our decisions should not be biased, should be in line with general considerations we have concerning the nature of reason, and should not completely disregard sufficiently significant intuitions at lower level. |
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ISSN: | 1783-1431 |
Contains: | Enthalten in: Ethical perspectives
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Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.2143/EP.28.2.3289668 |