Republican Limitarianism and Sufficientarianism: A Proposal for Attaining Freedom as Non-Domination
The present article explores the relationship between sufficientarianism, limitarianism and republicanism. In order to illustrate that relationship, I make three distinct, yet interconnected claims: that republicanism needs a conception of distributive justice, which should be a sufficientarian one;...
| Main Author: | |
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| Format: | Electronic Article |
| Language: | English |
| Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | Drawer...
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Published: |
Peeters
2020
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| In: |
Ethical perspectives
Year: 2020, Volume: 27, Issue: 4, Pages: 375-404 |
| Standardized Subjects / Keyword chains: | B
Republicanism
/ Wealth
/ Restriction
/ Distributive justice
/ Sufficiency
/ Freedom
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| IxTheo Classification: | NCE Business ethics VA Philosophy |
| Online Access: |
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
| Summary: | The present article explores the relationship between sufficientarianism, limitarianism and republicanism. In order to illustrate that relationship, I make three distinct, yet interconnected claims: that republicanism needs a conception of distributive justice, which should be a sufficientarian one; that limitarianism and sufficientarianism complement each other in order to make up a fully-fledged theory of justice; and that republicanism and limitarianism draw from each other in order to correct some of the issues that they would run into in non-ideal settings. In regard to the last claim, I try to defend the argument that freedom as non-domination can be instantiated in contemporary societies by setting upper limits to individuals’ wealth. However, implementing limitarianism sans republican policies could - in our non-ideal societies - lead to taxing more than just surplus money, a consequence of phenomena such as availability cascades, populism, group polarization or the outrage dynamic. Thus, we have compelling reasons to introduce a new justification for limitarianism, based on the value of freedom as non-domination. The result is what I call republican limitarianism. |
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| ISSN: | 1783-1431 |
| Contains: | Enthalten in: Ethical perspectives
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.2143/EP.27.4.3289451 |